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1.  Introduction
In discussions of global climate change, the level of world greenhouse gas emissions remains the
paramount issue to most analysts, and this is justified given their dominant role in driving the
phenomenon.  Interest wanes significantly when the analysis is disaggregated by only a single level, that
is, when distributional issues across countries are raised.  To date inequality in greenhouse gas emissions
across countries has received very limited analytical attention. Yet, in order to win the participation of as
many nations as possible in the United Nations climate change accord, which stipulates country-specific
emissions reduction targets, nations must perceive that the agreement is equitable (Paterson and Grubb
1996, Rowlands 1995). This is far from given.  The world's  leading greenhouse gas emitter, the U.S.,
has insisted on the "meaningful participation" of developing countries in curbing emissions.  In contrast,
the developing countries through the Group of 77 (G-77) and joined by China, have consistently rejected
U.S. calls for considering near term emission cuts, refusing even to open discussions on the notion at
recent international meetings.  The Third Conference of Parties (COP3) under the UN Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) adopted the Kyoto Protocol, which expressly excludes
developing countries from near term emissions reductions while legally obligating developed countries to
curb their emissions. However, its full ratification, and hence, implementation remain in grave doubt.  A
major obstacle to ratification remains the issue of equity between developed and developing countries.
The Fourth Conference of Parties (COP4) in November 1998 made some headway toward a blueprint for
implementing the Kyoto Protocol, but it achieved little to resolve the divisions between North and South.
In order to address the disparities in contributions toward global warming between developed
and developing nations, it is useful to consider national patterns of greenhouse gas emissions.  It is
known that the industrialized countries have emitted the lion's share of greenhouse gases in the past.
However, it is also documented that the share of emissions from developing countries is growing rapidly.
Does this mean that the developing nations will "naturally catch up" in emissions with developed
countries and therefore policies addressing international distribution are not required?  Or is convergence2
in emissions  a very distant  possibility  that should  not preclude  the implementation  of near term proposals
to decrease  not only emissions  but also emissions  inequality? Several  analysts  have suggested  that equal
per capita  emissions  ought to guide  future  allocation  of emissions  entitlements  (Bertram 1992,  Engelman
1994).  If redistribution  seems  warranted,  are  the Kyoto  Protocol  or pre-Kyoto  abatement  proposals
effective  in reducing  emissions  inequality  apart from their impact  on the levels  of emissions? Can they
be considered  as equitable?
To address  these issues,  this paper  uses country-level  per capita  carbon  emissions  scenarios  to
the year 2100 and various  decompositions  of the Gini index  of per capita  emissions. The Gini index  is
particularly  well suited  to a distributional  analysis  of carbon  emissions  because  it is associated  with
relative deprivation  theory  in which deprivation  depends  on the position  of each country  relative  to other
countries  (Yitzhaki 1983),  a concern  at work in negotiations  on reduction  targets. Section  2 presents  the
carbon  emissions  model and its results.  Two central  features  of the model are long  term convergence  in
per capita  GDP and the diminishing  marginal  propensity  to emit (MPE)  per capita-the  inverted-U
hypothesis. These  features  yield a decreasing  emissions  inequality  over time, which is analyzed  in more
detail in section  3 using a group  decomposition  of the Gini index. Section  4 is devoted  to an analysis  of
the impact  on the level and inequality  of emissions  of various abatement  proposals  for high income
countries,  with a focus  on the gap-narrowing  and reranking  effects  of these proposals. Section  5
concludes  the paper.
2.  Business-as-Usual  Emissions  Scenarios
2.1.  The model
Assessing  the impact  of policy  proposals  on the future  level of carbon  emissions 2 and on the
inequality  in emissions  requires  first obtaining  business-as-usual  country-level  projections  of per capita
2This  paper  refers  to emissions  of carbon  dioxide  (CO 2) in units  of carbon,  defined  as  the  weight  of  the  carbon  content
in carbon  dioxide. Carbon  units may be converted  to carbon  dioxide  by multiplying  by 44/12.3
emissions.  The model presented in this section was developed by Heil and Selden (1998), following
Holtz-Eakin and Selden (1995) in predicting per capita gross domestic product (GDP) and using the
projections to develop business-as-usual scenarios of per capita emissions. 3 Emissions are modeled as a
quadratic function of GDP (the cubic term in levels was not significant). 4 Data for carbon dioxide
emissions (1951-92) come from the sixth release of the DOE NDP-030 data set of the U.S. Oak Ridge
National Laboratory (Boden, Marland, and Andres 1995). These data include all major sources of
anthropogenic carbon emissions, except those from land-use changes which are not sufficiently
developed to be included in this study.'  PPP-adjusted GDP figures (1951-92) are provided by the Penn
World Tables Mark 5.6 (Summers and Heston 1991). The resulting uneven panel includes 135 countries
(4491 observations) representing nearly 90 percent of world population and three-fourths of carbon
emissions from fossil fuel use and cement manufacture. 6 Denoting per capita emissions (in kgs) by p,
and per capita PPP-adjusted GDP by y,,, the estimated emissions model is (standard errors in
parentheses):
pi,t  57.64 + 131.42 y, - 1.82  yi,2 + a, +  d,  (1)
(12.18)  (7.07)  (0.35)
R2=0.84  n=4491
where a, are fixed country effects and d, fixed year effects (see Heil and Selden 1998 for estimation
3See  Schmalensee,  Stoker,  and  Judson  (1998)  for an alternative  model  for  predicting  carbon  emissions  based on GDP.
4The  model  used here for distribution  analysis  is the baseline  quadratic  in levels  model. The quadratic  in logarithms
model  yields  considerably  less  convergence  in  per capita  emissions  over  the forecasting  period,  but the authors  believe
the levels  model  more accurately  represents  future trajectories  (Heil  and Selden 1998).
5The  omission  of land-use  emissions  alters  both  the emissions  totals and distributions.  In general,  the lower  income
countries  currently  have  higher  rates  of emissions  from land-use  (such  as from  deforestation),  which  means  their  overall
emissions  appear  relatively  lower  than  they  actually  are. The omission  of land-use  emissions  thereby  inflates  emissions
inequality  to a degree.
6The  sample  omits  the former Soviet  Union and Eastern  Europe,  as Heil and Selden  believed  their centrally-planned
economies  to be poor  representatives  of likely  future  economic  systems,  and  hence,  future  emissions  patterns.  Omission
of these high-emitters  causes  emissions  projections  to be lower than if the countries  were included (the impact  on
inequality  is uncertain).4
details). The fixed  year effects account,for  influences  (such as world  fuel prices)  not fully captured  by
GDP and affecting  all countries  equally in a given  year. The  fixed country  effects  are time-invariant
parameters  representing  the unique  characteristics  of countries  (such as climatic  factors)  that affect
emissions  independently  of GDP. F-tests  report  that a 1 are  jointly significantly  different  from zero, as are
the d,. The  parameter  estimates  imply  a diminishing  MPE  relationship  between per capita  emissions  and
per capita  GDP. The turning  point and subsequent  downturn  in per capita emissions  occurs  at currently
out-of-sample  levels of per capita  income  (around $36,000),  but these levels are reached  by developed
countries  during  the planning  horizon. As will be seen later, the diminishing  MPE has profound
distributional  implications  for the future.
Future emissions  trajectories  by country  are predicted  by incorporating  GDP forecasts  and
population  projections  into (1). For per capita  GDP projections,  also following  Holtz-Eakin  and Selden
(1995),  a univariate  time-series  was fitted on the historic data. The GDP model implies  convergence  in
growth  rates in the very long run.' Population  projections  are provided  by the World  Bank (1994).
2.2.  Global emissions
Figure I shows  the predicted  path of global  carbon  emissions,  population  (left scale),  and gross
world product  (right  scale)  to 2100 obtained  by summing  the country-level  projections. 8 Global
emissions  grow  to more  than double  their 1992  levels by 2050,  and to slightly less than four-fold  by
2100, in line with the Intergovermnental  Panel on Climate  Change  IS92a  reference  scenario  projections
(IPCC 1992). In 1993,  emissions  and population  are roughly equal,  with a worldwide  emissions  average
of one metric  ton per person per year. By 2100, global  per capita  emissions  more than double. These
global business-as-usual  emissions  exceed the cumulative  limits for stabilization  of CO 2 concentrations  at
7Convergence,  the notion  that economic  growth  rates and/or  real GDP levels  per capita  will tend to equalize  across
countries,  was bome of the Solow  growth  model  and remains  an unresolved  topic  of debate  in economics.  See for
example,  Islam  (1995) for a review  of previous  work and some  recent estimates.
8These  figures  are scaled-up  so they represent  the world,  not merely  the sample  of 135  countries.5
any level below 1000 parts per million, a near-quadrupling of the pre-industrial level. 9 Thus, without
intervention for abatement, the carbon emissions driving climate change will continue rising so that the
severity of climatic, ecological, and social impacts will surpass those generally discussed in the context
of a doubling of CO2 concentrations.  This confirms the necessity of enacting a policy of reducing
emissions from their predicted trajectories if climate change is to be mitigated.
Although the level of global emissions is likely to rise over time, the inequality in per capita
emissions is likely to recede.  The model includes two factors that drive emissions inequality downward.
First, the decreasing MPE as income increases implied by the negative coefficient of yjl 2 in (1) tends to
reduce emissions of very high income countries.  Second the income convergence implied by the GDP
projections enables low income countries to grow faster and progressively gain ground on higher income
countries.  How quickly does emissions convergence proceed?  Figure 2 provides the answer.  While
business-as-usual per capita mean emissions rise steadily, inequality in per capita emissions as measured
by the Gini index decreases slowly, albeit faster than income inequality because of the diminishing MPE.
2.3.  Emissions by groups of countries
Section 3 uses a group decomposition of the Gini index to analyze the contribution of groups of
countries to emissions inequality.  In order to understand the forces underlying future inequality trends, it
is important to analyze the baseline distribution at the start of the period.
Table 1 summarizes the state of affairs by income group in the first year (1993) and highlights
the prevailing disparities in carbon emissions between groups of nations.'"  Although more than three-
quarters of the world's population reside in the two lower income groups, these countries produce less
than one-third of gross world product and a slightly smaller share of global carbon emissions.  On a per
9Cumulative  emissions  and corresponding  atmospheric  concentrations  are provided  by IPCC  (1996).
10Income  groups  correspond  to those of the World  Bank (1995),  but are adjusted  in order  to convert  from GDP  at
market  exchange  rates  to GDP  at purchasing  power  parity.  Countries  are held in one and only  one group  throughout
the period 1993-2100,  that of their income  level in 1993.6
capita  basis,  the high income group's  inhabitants  possess  twelve  times the GDP  of low income  and lower-
middle income  residents. Moreover,  high income  individuals  generate  ten times the carbon  emissions  on
average of those in low income and lower-middle  income  countries. This inequality  is reflected  in the
high overall Ginis  of 0.557 for per capita income  and 0.607 for per capita  carbon  emissions  (starting
values shown  in Figure  2).
Figure 3 shows  the differences  in emissions  levels  between  groups  tend to diminish  over time.
This is largely a result  of the diminishing  MPE property  of the model. As noted earlier,  per capita
emissions  rise with income  growth  at lower income levels,  peak  at about $36,000  income  per capita,  and
descend  at higher  income levels. Hence,  the high income  group's emissions  rise to about  4.5 tons per
capita  in 2040,  then steadily  decline  over the last 60 years. The upper-middle  income group's  per capita
emissions  rise until 2080,  then decline. In contrast,  the lower-middle  and low income groups  do not
reach  their per capita  emissions  peaks by 2100. The lower-middle  group's  emissions  per person  grow
more  rapidly than  those of the low income group  as a result of faster income  growth  in lower-middle
countries. Per capita  emissions  of the upper-middle  and lower-middle  groups  come  together in 2100, and
all groups  converge  in the long run. Figure 4 presents  another  interesting  result. The ratio of per capita
emissions  to income  measures  the emissions  intensity  of GDP. The lower  the ratio,  the more energy
efficient  and the cleaner  the economic  system. All income groups  advance  toward lower emissions
intensity  of production  because  of the diminishing  MPE,  but the two higher income  groups  have  the
steepest  downward  slopes,  in part because  they possess  more  advanced  technology  to restrain emissions.
Figure 5 shows  the changes  in (absolute,  not per capita)  emissions  shares  by income group. The
trend toward per capita  convergence  shown in the previous  figure  masks  the large differences  in
population  growth  rates between  groups  that spur dramatic  changes  in total emissions  by group. Most
notably,  the share of overall emissions  represented  by the high income  group drops  from 0.62 to 0.14
during the period. The bulk of the high income group's  loss is accounted  for by the low income  group's
gain,  which climbs  from about one-fifth  to over half of global  carbon  emissions. The lower-middle7
group's  share  triples to one-fourth  while  that of the upper-middle  group  remains relatively  stable at less
than one-tenth  of the global total. The shift in emissions  shares  by group  explains  why high income
countries  are concerned  about  future  emissions  from low income  nations. It also highlights  the reason
participation  of developing  countries  is considered  essential  for a successful  global  climate change  treaty.
3.  Group Decomposition of Emissions Inequality
To analyze in more detail why inequality in emissions gradually declines over time, a group
decomposition of the Gini index proposed by Yitzhaki and Lerman (1991) can be used.  This method was
used by Heil and Wodon (1997) to examine the historic evolution of per capita carbon emissions
inequality across countries." 1 The decomposition suggests the critical factor is the reduction of inequality
between groups of countries rather than within groups.  Dropping the "it" subscripts for simplicity,
denote by p per capita emissions, by F the country rank in the cumulative distribution of per capita
emissions  (F is 0 for the lowest emitting country and 1 for the highest emitting country), and by FN  its
rank in the cumulative distribution of all countries except those of its own income group.  If covk  (x, y) is
the covariance  between  x andy over the members  of group k, and pk  is mean emissions for countries in
group k, the Gini index Gk and the stratification index Qk  of group k are defined as:
Gk = 2Covk (p,  F)/pk  (2)
Qk  =  COVk[,  (F - FN)]/Covk  (p, F)  (3)
The interpretation of the Gini index is well known. The stratification index measures the overlap
between groups in the per capita levels of emissions.  When Qk=l, no countty in groups other than k has
emissions that fall between the emissions of two countries in group k, and group k forms a perfect
stratum.  When Qk  =  -1, the countries in group k have emissions levels at the two extremes of the
"'See also  Wodon  and Heil (1999).8
distribution  (two  perfect strata), and all the other  countries  fall in between. When  Qk=  0 for all k, the
groups  completely  overlap  each other. The Gini index  can be decomposed  into three components  as
follows:
G  =  k SkGk  +  2k  SkGkQk(Hk  - 1) + 2 COV(pk,  Fk)/pW  (4)
where  F. is the mean rank of countries  in group  k among  all countries,  Hk is the population  share of
countries  in group  k, Sk is the emissions  share of countries  in group  k, and  pw  is the mean  per capita
emissions  level in the world as a whole. The first term on the right side of (4) represents  within  group
inequality  (the weighted  sum of the within  group Ginis  with emissions  shares  as weights). The second
term, accounting  for stratification,  is typically  negative  because  the stratification  indices  Qk  tend to be
positive  (population  shares  Hk are smaller  than one). The third  term accounts  for between  group
inequality  and is a direct extension  for groups  of the Gini index  (2).
Figure 6 illustrates  the decline  in the Gini index  over time is almost fully  due to the fall of the
between  group component  of the decomposition.  Until  about 2030,  the between  groups  component
remains  relatively  high because  most high income  countries  have not yet reached  the level of GDP at
which  per capita emissions  turn downward  and low income  countries' GDPs  remain low. Throughout
the first 50 years, the between  group component  accounts  for 60 percent or more of total inequality. This
implies  that during that period,  emissions  reductions  targeted  to the higher  income groups  would be
effective  in reducing  both the level and the inequality  of emissions. In 2100 by contrast,  the between
group  component  accounts  for only 27 percent of the Gini. Note also the decrease  (in absolute  value) of
the stratification  component  of the decomposition  in Figure 6. In 1993,  stratification  indices  (Qk)  for the
four groups  from lowest  to highest  income  are 0.407, 0.497,  0.878,  and 0.987, indicating  that the top two
groups  form almost perfect  strata. As per capita  emissions  decrease  (increase)  in the high (low) income
group in the latter half of the forecasting  period, its stratification  index  Qk  shrinks  as well, driving  the9
stratification component of the decomposition towards zero.
Annual per capita emissions are thus likely to gradually become more equally distributed over
time.  What about cumulative per capita emissions?  Historical responsibility for the enhanced
greenhouse effect has been a contentious topic in climate treaty discussions.  Since carbon dioxide
influences equilibrium concentrations in the atmosphere for roughly 100 years, the large contributions of
the developed countries will continue affecting the climate system until the end of the forecasting period.
Is convergence in cumulative emissions attained during the next century?  Table 2 compares the Gini and
its components for annual emissions in 1993 and 2100, and for cumulative emissions over the entire
period.  When cumulative emissions are examined, the downward trend in inequality weakens, with a
Gini of 0.425, and a between group component accounting for more than half the inequality in
cumulative emissions, nearly the proportion in 1993. In per capita terms, the higher income countries'
cumulative emissions will continue to dominate those of lower income groups throughout the next
century, and their contribution to climate change will remain well out of proportion to their populations.
4.  The Kyoto  Protocol  and Other  Abatement  Proposals
4.1.  Target reductions for Annex II countries
The need for public policy to curtail global greenhouse gas emissions if climate change is to be
mitigated is widely acknowledged." 2 Recent experience in developing a global emissions reduction
policy at COP3, COP4, and their preparatory meetings highlights the centrality of North-South
distribution issues." 3 How should the burden of emissions reduction be shared?  Should reductions be
made, say, by reducing all nations' emissions by equal proportions (no redistribution), or by some
distinctly targeted plan (involving redistribution)?  The large between group component of the Gini
12The IPCC's  First  Assessment  Report  noted  that an immediate  reduction  of 60-80  percent of current  carbon
emissions  would  be necessary  to stabilize  atmospheric  concentrations  at their 1990  levels  (IPCC 1990).
"3For  example,  Welsch  (1993)  appliedthe  Gini  index  to examine  the inequality  effects  of  alternative  emissions  scenarios
for a sample  of countries.10
decomposition shown in the preceding section suggests that reductions limited to higher income
countries should be effective in lowering both the level of emissions and the inequality in per capita
emissions.14 Not surprisingly, most pre-COP3 abatement proposals, such as those presented at the March
1997 session of the Ad-hoc Group on the Berlin Mandate (AGBM), involve redistribution in emissions,
chiefly by requesting Annex I or II (the high income nations, see list of countries in the appendix)
countries to reduce their emissions by some target percentage by early next century while non-Annex I or
II countries continue growing unabated.  Not withstanding the U.S. call for developing country
participation, none of the official proposals on the table in Kyoto set emissions reduction targets for
developing countries." 5 The report of the AGBM does not state the originator of the proposals, but it is
well known that, say, proposal 1 which requests a 20 percent reduction of anthropogenic emissions of
Annex I countries is favored by the Alliance of Small Island States.  All proposals refer to percentage
reductions relative to 1990 absolute (not per capita) emissions levels." 6 Proposals differ according to
their target date (in most cases 2010), target reduction, and/or determination mechanism (some proposals
impose higher reductions at future dates for countries not meeting earlier reduction targets).
Table 3 presents the impact that the Kyoto Protocol and various other target reduction proposals
for Annex II countries-the  countries with both high levels of emissions and the financial means to
reduce them-would  have on the level and inequality in emissions in 2010.17 The business-as-usual
figures come from the emissions model.  Figures for the target reductions were obtained by using the
'4This conclusion  is confirmed  when  applying  the group  decomposition  to historical  data as well. Heil and Wodon
(1997)  show  that  half of overall  per capita carbon  emissions  inequality  across  111  nations  1960-90  is accounted  for  by
just two income  groups.
'5The 1995  Berlin  Mandate  noted that  developing  countries  should  not be held  to emission  limitations  in  the near term.
However,  in November  1998  at COP4,  for the first  time  two  non-Annex  I parties  (Argentina  and  Kazakhstan)  agreed
to enact  voluntary  emissions  restrictions  in  the near term.
16This  is not to  be confused  with  reductions  relative  to projected  business-as-usual  (in the absence  of policy)  emissions
in  2010. Given  expected  economic  and population  growth,  any emissions  limit  would  appear  to be a greater  reduction
if it were expressed  relative  to business-as-usual  projections  in 2010 rather  than in relation  to 1990  levels.
"The U.S. proposal  and the Kyoto  Protocol  use a flexible  target date of 2008-2012. This  paper uses 2010 as a target
date for consistency  with other  proposals,  with a negligible  impact  on the Gini  outcomes.11
projected  emissions  for non-Annex  II countries,  and imposing  the target emissions  reductions  for each
Annex  II country. Note that if population  increases  in an Annex  II country,  its per capita  emissions  must
decrease  by more than  the target reduction  since  the target is expressed  in the country's  total emissions,
not per capita emissions. In terms of climatic  effects,  the key unit of analysis  is global emission  totals
(column 1), obtained  by multiplying  per capita  emissions  by population  across  all countries  in the
sample, and scaling up to reflect  global  totals. Carbon emissions,  regardless  of geographic  origin,  have
equal effects on atmospheric  concentrations,  and all emissions  contribute  to the total. For distributional
analysis,  the relevant  unit of analysis  is, as before,  per capita  emissions  (mean in column  2 and Gini in
column  3).
Table 3 shows that business-as-usual  mean per capita  emissions  will rise by 2010,  but that
emissions  inequality  will decline  modestly  (as shown in Figure  2). Although  these proposals  with
reductions  ranging  from 0 to 20 percent  (by Annex  I or II) cannot  constrain  global  emissions  in 2010  to
their 1990  level, in large  part because  of population  growth,  they do reduce  emissions  inequality
somewhat.
4.2.  Gap-narrowing and reranking effects of target reductions
When  imposing  target reductions  to groups  of countries,  the distributional  objective  is typically
to reduce  the gaps in per capita  emissions  levels between  countries,  not to change the ranks or relative
positions  of countries  in terms of their per capita  emissions. To provide  an analogy,  in the context  of
income  and progressive  taxation,  tax schemes  are not intended  to impose  a burden on high income
individuals  so great  that after taxes, their net income  falls below the net income  of those with lower  gross
incomes. To analyze  the gap-narrowing  effect (holding  ranks constant)  and the reranking  effect (holding
per capita  emissions  constant)  of abatement  proposals  for Annex  II countries,  a decomposition  provided
by Lerman  and Yitzhaki  (1995) can be used. Denote  the business-as-usual  emissions  Gini by GB  and the
Gini after implementation  of the abatement  proposal  by  GA  If s = P/Pu, the ratio of a country's  per capita12
emissions to the world average, the change in the Gini can be decomposed as the sum of two
components:
GB - GA  = 2cov (SB  - sA, FA)  + 2cov (SB, FB  - FA)  (5)
The first component on the right hand side of (S) is the gap-narrowing effect, and the second
component is the reranking effects.  The last two columns of Table 3 give the results of the
decomposition.  Because Annex II countries have very high relative emissions levels, reducing their
emissions by any amount less than 50 percent compared to 1990 levels induces little reranking.
Reductions beyond that threshold, however, implies much greater reranking.  For a reduction of 70
percent in Annex II, 40 percent of the decrease in the Gini is due to reranking.  For a reduction of 90
percent, all of the gain is due to reranking. The implication of this analysis is that as long as the reduction
required of Annex II countries does not exceed 50 percent in 2010, (far greater than any proposed
reduction) there need not be much concern about reranking.  The average reduction for Annex II
countries specified in the Kyoto Protocol is 5.2 percent, an amount that has some bearing on overall
emissions inequality, but no reranking effects.
Rather than imposing uniform percentage reduction targets across all Annex II countries, it is
possible to set differential targets for individual countries while reaching an overall target for a group.
The Kyoto Protocol takes this approach by stipulating anywhere from a 10 percent increase (Iceland) to
an 8 percent cut (several countries) in emissions (relative to 1990) for each of the Annex I countries to
achieve the overall 5.2 percent reduction.'8 This differentiation may allow greater consideration of both
efficiency (relative costs of reducing) and equity (who must reduce and by how much).  Table 3 shows
that the Kyoto agreement results in less per capita emissions inequality than does a uniform reduction of
'8A complete  listing  of emissions  targets  by country  for the Kyoto  Protocol  and the for European  Union  proposal is
given in a footnote  to Table 3.13
the same amount.  Given the relatively small emissions reduction, there is little impact on gap-narrowing
and reranking.  The European Union (EU) abatement proposal announced in March 1997 also used
flexible targets by country (within the Union) to achieve a 15 percent emissions cut for the EU.  Germany
would reduce its emissions by 25 percent, while Portugal, a less developed economy, could increase its
emissions by 40 percent.  In addition to a lower Gini, the EU proposal entailed less reranking than a
uniform 15 percent reduction by all EU countries. In the future, coordinated actions among other groups
of countries could help in reducing both the levels and inequality in emissions, and presumably at a lower
cost.
4.3.  Implementation alternatives and quasi-emissions
The reduction targets discussed above do not stipulate how the targets should be achieved.  Apart
from real emissions reductions obtained through, say, clean air and energy efficiency regulation in Annex
II countries, policy tools such as tradeable emissions permits (TEPs) and joint implementation (JI) may
be used." 9 Under a TEP system, countries with emissions above their target can buy TEPs from countries
whose emissions fall below their target.  Under JI, a high income (investor) country provides financial
and/or technical resources to a low income (host) country in order to reduce emissions in the latter.  The
investor country is partially or fully credited with the emissions offset due to its investment (Kuik, Peters,
and Schrijver 1994).32  The Kyoto Protocol envisions using variations of both mechanisms in order to
achieve emissions cuts at a lower cost than if all reductions had to be made domestically.
The working assumption behind both JI and TEPs is that, despite the lower per capita emissions
in developing countries, often the marginal cost of abatement is smaller than in developed nations.  This
is due primarily to the fact that environmental regulation and the oil price shocks of the 1970s prompted
'9Both  a TEP  system  and a JI system  (through  the Clean  Development  Mechanism)  were set  up in principle  at the COP3.
20JI projects  may be carried  out by firms  or municipal  government  collaboration,  not necessarily  by national
governments.  JI projects  are underway  in numerous  countries,  but their emission  offsets  are not formally  credited  to
investors  under  this current  pilot phase.14
developed  countries  to substantially  improve  energy  efficiency  through  enhanced  technologies  and
conservation. In contrast,  the developing  countries' regulation  generally  has not been as stringent,  and
oil prices  had less impact  on their less fossil fuel intensive  production  systems. Therefore,  opportunities
for easily improved  energy  efficiency  have been largely  exhausted  in developed  countries,  while
opportunities  for low cost improvements  remain  unexploited  in developing  countries.
Consider  a scenario  from the transportation  sector  that establishes  conditions  conducive  to a JI
agreement. Transport  in countries  at low income levels  takes  place through predominantly  non-
motorized  (and carbon-free)  forns such as walking,  bicycling,  rickshaws,  and animal-drawn  vehicles. At
slightly  higher incomes,  a proportion  of commuters  converts  to using the cheapest motorized  private
transport  available,  scooters  or motorcycles,  which generate  relatively  high carbon  emissions  per
passenger  kilometer  traveled. Public  transportation  systems  tend  to be modest  in scope. When  middle
income  levels are attained,  fewer passengers  use non-motorized  transport  and a substantial  fraction shifts
from motorcycles  to automobiles.  Public  transport  includes  standard  buses and micro-buses. These
vehicles generally  bum less cleanly  than those in high income countries  due to the older (or nonexistent)
abatement  technology,  the lack of stringent  emissions  standards  (which permit highly  polluting  vehicles
such as those with two-stroke  engines),  and poor operating  conditions  (such as chronic  traffic congestion)
that reduce fuel  efficiency  and raise emissions. At this point, carbon  emissions  per capita from transport
in middle income  nations  may exceed those in wealthier  countries,  a condition  ripe for a JI agreement.
The Netherlands  are currently funding  a JI project involving  fuel conversion  in Hungary. The idea is to
transfer  the technical knowledge  needed  to convert  Hungary's  diesel fuel buses  to run on compressed
natural gas. The project is small (5 buses only),  which is typical  of JI projects so far, but it has been
Although  high  income  countries  are  marked  by much  greater  private  vehicle  ownership  rates,  usage  varies
widely.  In Australia  and  the  U.S.,  average  passenger  kilometers  traveled  rates  are  high,  largely  due  to spatial
dispersion  and relatively  weak  public  transport  infrastructures.  In contrast,  the  high  income  Asian  and  European
countries,  marked  by greater  population  densities  and  efficient  public  transport  systems,  have  considerably  lower
private  vehicle  usage. But  overall,  transport  sector  carbon  emissions  per capita  in high  income  countries  tends  to
level  off  and  may  even  be reduced.  For  example,  per capita  car  use  in Kuala  Lumpur  fell  well  below  that  of Boston
and  Los  Angeles,  but exceeded  that  of London  and  Paris  in 1990  (Kenworthy  et. al 1997).15
estimated that if all 3,000-4,000 public buses in the major Hungarian cities were converted, 6.4 kilotons
of emissions per year would be abated (JIQ 1996).
The Gini analysis and decompositions used in this paper have been applied to projected real
emissions only.  However, given the likelihood of some form of TEPs and JI in the future, it may be
thought the analysis becomes uninteresting.  On the contrary, by defining quasi-emissions as real
emissions minus TEPs purchased and minus JI carbon offset credits, the inequality in per capita quasi-
emissions may be analyzed readily. 22 This would enable the inequality impacts of various trading
schemes to be assessed and compared against inequality in real emissions.  Since it is likely that
developed countries would buy TEPs and fund JI projects in developing countries, it is expected that
inequality in quasi-emissions would exceed that in real emissions.
4.  Conclusion
Since the UN Conference on Environment and Development in 1992, the international
community has devoted significant resources to assessing the threat of global climate change and forging
a legally binding treaty to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases.  The effort has been painstaking and the
progress halting at times, but the complex process involving 166 formal parties has inched forward.  In
December 1997, the process was boosted by the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol at COP3, which
mandates that 3  8 developed countries reduce six greenhouse gases by an average of 5.2 percent relative
to 1990 levels by 2008-2012.
Despite that achievement, ratification and implementation of the Kyoto Protocol remains in
doubt.  And the recent COP4 made only limited gains toward cementing its implementation.  The
distribution of greenhouse gas emissions is a critical component of the equity issues that may influence
the ultimate success or failure of the UN climate convention process.  If per capita emissions equalize
naturally through income convergence and improved energy use at higher levels of GDP, redistributive
22See  Heil and Wodon  (1997)  for details  on quasi-emissions.16
(or compensatory)  interventions  may appear  unnecessary.  Using a model for projecting  emissions  and a
group  decomposition  of the Gini index,  this paper  has shown  that long-run  convergence  in per capita
emissions  may be indeed  likely, but that it occurs slowly. Moreover,  a few countries  are historically
responsible  for creating  and aggravating  much of the problem. When  cumulative  per capita emissions
are considered,  the case  for addressing  emissions  inequality  through distributional  or compensatory
policies become  even  more compelling.
The major pre-Kyoto  proposals  for emissions  reduction  required  differential  reductions  by
groups  of countries  (United  Nations 1992,  United  Nations 1997). Although  the definition  of these groups
is not strictly  tied to income,  in practice,  Annex II countries  belong  to the high income  group. The large
between  group component  of the decomposition  conducted  in the paper  suggests  that targeted  reductions
should  be effective  not only in reducing  overall emissions  but also emissions  inequality,  and this may be
an important  determinant  of its success. This was confirmed  using a range of proposals  for Annex  II
countries  in reference  to targets to be reached by 2010. It was also shown that the proposals  and the
Kyoto  Protocol  itself have very limited  reranking  effects,  so that most of the reduction  in the emissions
Gini is achieved  through narrowing  the gaps between  high and low emitting  countries. This should  allay
concerns  among  members  of the U.S. Congress  and the Clinton  Administration  that reductions  by only
Annex  II countries  would  impose  an unfair  burden on the U.S. Finally,  the distributional  analysis  could
be extended  to include  tradeable  permits,  joint implementation,  or other mechanisms  used to achieve
target reductions.17
Appendix
List of Annex II countries
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland,
Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
Turkey, United Kingdom, United States18
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Income and Wealth. 37, 313-329.Table  1. Summary  emissions  statistics,  1993 for 135 nations
Income  Group  Low  Lower-  Upper-  High  Total
income  middle  middle  income
Countries  48  40  17  30  135
Population  2,925  886  285  813  4,909
Population  share  0.596  0.181  0.058  0.166  1.000
GDP  3,716  2,559  1,870  12,293  20,437
GDP share  0.182  0.125  0.091  0.601  1.000
Emissions  978  370  383  2,773  4,504
Emissions  share  0.217  0.082  0.085  0.616  1.000
Mean p.c. emissions  0.334  0.417  1.347  3.410  0.918
Mean p.c. GDP  1,270  2,887  6,571  15,118  4,163
Mean p.c. emissions/  0.260  0.145  0.205  0.226  0.221
Mean p.c. GDP  I  I  _  I
Source: Author's calculations using PWT56 and ORNL.
Note: This table is based on 135 nations and is not scaled up to represent the whole world.
Units:  Population in millions.  GDP in billions of PPP-adjusted 1985 U.S. dollars.
Emissions in millions of metric tons.  Per capita emissions in metric tons.  Per capita GDP in units.
Table 2. Yearly and cumulative emissions decomposition for 135 nations
Cumulative 1993-2100  Annual 1993  Annual 2100
Within group component  0.186  0.264  0.176
Stratification component  -0.098  -0.155  -0.044
Between group component  0.338  0.498  0.109
Overall Gini  0.425  0.607  0.241
Source: Authors' computations from ORNL and PWT56.  Numbers may not add up due to rounding.
Note: This table is based on 135 nations and is not scaled up to represent the whole world.Table 3.  Annex II abatement proposals, emissions levels and inequality for 135 nations
Global  Per capita  Per capita  Change  due to  | Change  due to
emissions  emissions  emissions  Gini  gap-narrowing  reranking
1990  benchmark  5.701  0.902  0.613  l
2010 projections
Business-as-usual  8.308  0.983  0.586  -
0% reduction  7.066  0.836  0.535  0.051  0.001
5.2%  reduction  6.884  0.815  0.525  0.060  0.001
5.2% reduction Kyoto  - - 0.523  0.062  0.001
10%  reduction  6.676  0.790  0.517  0.066  0.003
15  %reduction  6.560  0.776  0.510  0.071  0.005
15% reduction EU  - - 0.508  0.074  0.004
20% reduction  6.320  0.748  0.498  0.084  0.005
30% reduction  5.963  0.706  0.477  0.102  0.008
50%  reduction  5.250  0.621  0.428  0.138  0.021
70%  reduction  4.537  0.537  0.376  0.127  0.084
90%  reduction  3.829  0.453  0.375  -0.286  0.497
Source:  Authors'  computations  from ORNL  and  PWT56. Numbers  may not add  up due to rounding.
Notes: Global  emissions  totals  are scaled  up to represent  the world. All other  figures  are based on the sample  of
135  nations  only. Per capita  emissions  are affected  by the omission  of the former Soviet  Union  and Eastem  Europe.
Except  where  otherwise  specified,  all percentage  reductions  are uniform  for  Annex II countries  only.
The  Kyoto  Protocol  specifies  the following  reductions  compared  to 1990  levels:  Australia  +8%,  Austria -8%,
Belgium  -8%,  Bulgaria  -8%, Canada  -6%,  Croatia  -5%, Czech  Republic  -8%, Denmark  -8%,  Estonia  -8%, Finland
-8%,  France  -8%, Germany  -8%, Greece  -8%, Hungary  -6%, Iceland  +10%, Ireland  -8%, Italy -8%, Japan  -6%,
Latvia  -8%, Liechtenstein  -8%, Lithuania  -8%,  Luxembourg  -8%,  Monaco  -8%,  Netherlands  -8%,  New Zealand
0%, Norway  +1%,  Poland  -6%, Portugal  -8%, Romania  -8%, Russian  Federation  0%, Slovakia  -8%, Slovenia  -8%,
Spain  -8%,  Sweden  -8%, Switzerland  -8%, Ukraine  0%, United  Kingdom  -8%, United  States  -7%.
The EU COP3  proposal  (not adopted)  for EU countries  is as follows: Belgium  -10%,  Denmark  -25%,  Germany
-25%,  Greece  +30%, Spain  +17%,  France  0%, Ireland  +15%,  Italy -7%, Luxembourg  -30%,  Netherlands  -10%,
Austria  -25%,  Portugal  +40%,  Finland  0%, Sweden  +5%,  United  Kingdom  -10%.
Both versions  of the 5.2%  emissions  cut and both  versions  of the 15%  reduction  yield equivalent  global  and per
capita  emissions  although  our computations  resulted  in very slight  differences  due to negligible  data variations.
Units: Global  emissions  in  metric gigatons. Per capita emissions  in metric  tons.Figure  1. Global  Carbon  Emissions,  Income,
and Population  Projections  1993-2100
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